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Has MERCOSUR’s trade performance to date provided strong evidence that it has
encouraged inefficient trade flows between its members? This paper evaluates the
methodology suggested by Yeats (1997, 1998) to study trade flows within MERCOSUR.
Yeats was motivated by the traditional concern of economists that regional trading
arrangements can be welfare-reducing by fostering trade diversion (the replacement of
efficiently produced goods from outside the arrangement by inefficiently produced goods
from inside). His methodology was based on comparing shifts in intra-regional exports with a
measure of relative efficiency in production. This paper argues that Yeats should have instead
focused on imports. There has been a strong growth in intra-regional imports, but imports
from third countries have also grown impressively. This reflects the increased multilateral
openness of the MERCOSUR economies. If Yeats’ methodology is adapted to examine trends
in imports, the evidence for significant trade diversion is less clear-cut than he suggested. It is
difficult to have a clear idea about whether MERCOSUR producers are efficient suppliers of
different goods. However, even for the cases where one may have some doubts, the growth in
intra-MERCOSUR imports has been accompanied by growing trade with the rest of the
world. In addition, the formation of MERCOSUR does not appear to have seriously
compromised these countries’ imports of high technology products from the industrialized
countries.
* European Commission – Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. The author is grateful to
André Sapir for many helpful conversations on this topic, and to Marco Buti, Ulrike Hauer and Jan Host Schmidt
for comments on a previous version of this paper. The research assistance of Karin Granevi and Claudio Lettieri is
also gratefully acknowledged.23
0(5&2685DQG7UDGH'LYHUVLRQ:KDW'R7KH,PSRUW)LJXUHV7HOO8V"
,QWURGXFWLRQ
The last decade has witnessed a renewed interest in regional economic integration in many
parts of the world. The European Union’s single market programme and the NAFTA (the
North American Free-Trade Agreement) are the primary examples, but many developing
countries have also been part of this trend. Perhaps the most well known case of regional
economic integration among developing countries in recent years is the customs union
arrangement known as the 0HUFDGR &RP~Q GHO &RQR 6XU (MERCOSUR), involving
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
For economists, customs unions and other regional integration schemes, such as free-trade
areas, have ambiguous welfare effects. This is because regional schemes remove distortions
between the relative price of domestic goods and partner-country goods, but LQWURGXFH
another distortion between the relative price of goods which originate within the arrangement
and those from outside. In the classic terminology of Jacob Viner, regional schemes can lead
to both WUDGHFUHDWLRQ and WUDGHGLYHUVLRQ. It is difficult to say DSULRULwhich of these two
effects will dominate. In addition, the empirical analysis of regional arrangements has been
hampered by a lack of reliable procedures for studying changes in trade flows. In a recent
paper, Yeats (1997, 1998) proposed a new methodology for evaluating regional schemes. He
used an index of regional orientation to examine whether individual products are more or less
likely to be traded with partner countries compared to the rest of the world. He combined this
index with a measure of apparent comparative advantage, to see whether partner countries
could be considered relatively efficient producers of these goods. Yeats used this
methodology to study the trade of the MERCOSUR countries.
The analysis he conducted led him to the conclusion that much of the increase in trade
between the MERCOSUR countries was in the “wrong” products. Many of the products were
capital-intensive in production, i.e. they required relatively more capital than labour to
produce them. Traditional (Heckscher-Ohlin) trade theory tells us that countries which are
capital-abundant should be relatively efficient at producing capital-intensive goods, whilst
countries with relatively higher endowments of labour should be more efficient at producing
labour-intensive goods. The assumed comparative advantage of the MERCOSUR countries,
Yeats argued, is in labour-intensive goods, so the fact that capital-intensive goods feature
prominently in their trade with each other is a cause for concern.4
Yeats’ study attracted a great deal of attention. In part, this was because of the general interest
in regional economic integration and its implications for world trade.
1 For example, many
believe that an excessive reliance on regionalism will divert attention from the multilateral
system and so reduce the prospects for securing global free trade. However, much of the
interest in Yeats’ study stems from the growing importance of the MERCOSUR arrangement
itself. Table 1 shows that the combined GNP of the MERCOSUR countries exceeded $880
billion in 1995, and that their combined population was over 200 million. With the prospect
of a Free-Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) some time early in the next century, the
MERCOSUR bloc may be an important counterbalance to the United States in future
negotiations.
2 The possibility also exists of a free-trade area between MERCOSUR and the
EU. The EU is the principal trading partner of the MERCOSUR countries and regards
MERCOSUR as “a new growth centre of worldwide importance and one of strategic
importance to Europe”.
3 At the EU-Latin American summit held in Panama in February 1998,
EU and MERCOSUR leaders again raised the possibility of concluding a free-trade area
agreement. Argentina and Brazil, are clearly beginning to emerge as important actors in
global trade negotiations. For these countries, this fact probably serves as a visible sign to the
rest of the world that they have finally put the debt crisis of the 1980s behind them.
MERCOSUR is also the principal example of regional integration between developing
countries in the world today. Its success or failure will therefore be seen as a test case for the
renewed efforts which other developing countries are now making to foster integration
between themselves. One problem in the past is that many so-called “South-South”
integration schemes involved countries with small markets, low incomes and comparable
production structures. As a consequence, there was little opportunity for trade creation.
Indeed, many previous attempts at regional integration by developing countries seemed
designed to encourage trade diversion. As noted by de Melo and Dhar (1992), there were a
number of reasons for this. Tariff concessions were usually negotiated item by item and
countries were therefore encouraged to be highly selective in the offers they made. As a
                                               
1 See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati’s article in The Economist, (‘Bhagwati on Trade: Fast track to nowhere’, The Economist,
18 October, 1997, pp23-26).
2 Bhagwati (1994) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) suggest that a hegemonic country, such as the United States, would want
to bargain sequentially with smaller countries in establishing a free-trade area, since the bargaining position of the latter is
weaker when they are more isolated. Political lobbies (such as the environmental lobby and the labour standards lobby) in the
hegemonic country will also be more likely to bind small countries into obligations in areas which concern them in regional
agreements which are negotiated one at a time. The formation of MERCOSUR may therefore be a rational response by South
American countries to the possibility of an otherwise hegemon-dominated hemispheric agreement, since as a customs union
MERCOSUR countries would bargain collectively.
3 European Commission (1994), p12.5
consequence, trade liberalization was less than complete. In addition, high levels of protection
were maintained against third countries. The Latin American experience of regional
integration in the 1960s was a classic example of import-substitution policies, pursued at a
regional level. Rajapatirana (1994) points out that these policies resulted in reduced trade
within the region as well as with the rest of the world.
At first sight, MERCOSUR seems to be quite different from previous Latin American
regionalism. According to Foders, “a country that decides to join neighbour countries in
setting up a trade regime like MERCOSUR demonstrates that its policymakers hold a view of
trade liberalization and foreign competition that radically departs from the protectionist views
held in the past to justify inward-looking policies.”
4 In the case of MERCOSUR, each country
has undertaken fundamental macroeconomic and structural reforms, including a strong
unilateral liberalization of its trade and investment regime. This is part of the general trend
towards economic reform and more open trade regimes in Latin America as a whole – a
phenomenon which is well documented (see, for example, Edwards, 1994).
A comparison with the EU experience of regional integration is perhaps helpful. The “deep”
integration which the EU has achieved may be contrasted with the “shallow” integration
which the MERCOSUR countries have managed up to now.
5 The accepted view is that
regional integration within the EU has had a positive impact on the welfare of its member
countries. Writing in 1975, Balassa concluded that “trade creation has been substantial in
absolute terms and has exceeded trade diversion several times.”
6 He found strong evidence of
intra-industry specialization in manufacturing, which enabled the exploitation of economies
of scale. There were also gains from the rationalization of production in response to
intensified competition in a wider market. These so-called “dynamic effects” of economic
integration had already been highlighted (Balassa, 1961). As Sapir (1992) notes, dynamic
effects were at the heart of the EU’s single market programme, which aimed at abolishing all
remaining barriers to the free circulation of goods, services, people and capital by the end of
1992. The most recent evaluation conducted by the European Commission suggests that EU
GDP is now 1% higher than it would have been without the single market (European
                                               
4 Foders (1996), p3.
5 The terms “deep” and “shallow” integration were coined by Robert Lawrence. He noted that once tariffs are removed on intra-
regional trade, there remains the complex question of how to reconcile different national regulatory policies. So-called “shallow”
integration is based on the view that these should be determined and administered at the national level, with partner-country
goods and firms given non-discriminatory, national treatment. This can be contrasted with “deep” integration, which is based on
the adoption of common rules and policies and supra-national implementation mechanisms. See, for example, Lawrence (1997).
6 Balassa (1975), p16. This conclusion applied only to trade in manufactures, since there were welfare losses associated with the
EU’s agricultural policies.6
Commission, 1996). Of course, as EU member countries become richer there can also be
positive spill-overs for non-member countries, the most obvious being through increased
demand for third-country imports.
Of the various lessons which may be drawn from the EU experience, there are two which
seem to be among the most pertinent for Latin America. The first is that, by their very nature,
dynamic gains take time to be fully realised. Since MERCOSUR is still in its infancy, one
cannot expect to evaluate fully its welfare implications by examining data for a limited time-
period.
7 The second is that external trade liberalization is a key complement to the removal of
barriers on intra-regional trade. In an important study, Jacquemin and Sapir (1991), found that
it is H[WUD-EU imports which exert a pro-competitive effect on price-cost margins in the EU.
This strengthens the case for following a combination of internal and external trade
liberalization rather than pursuing internal liberalization on its own.
7KHWUDGHUHJLPHRIWKH0(5&2685FRXQWULHV
MERCOSUR was created by the Treaty of Asunción of March 1991.
8 It seems to have been
partly inspired by the Treaty of Rome, one of the founding documents of the EU. The
Asunción Treaty called for the gradual establishment of a common market and specified a
transition period from June 1991 to December 1994, during which time tariffs on intra-
MERCOSUR trade were to be gradually eliminated and a common external tariff (CET)
adopted. There was some slippage in achieving this objective, but when the MERCOSUR
“customs union” officially began operating on 1 January 1995, approximately 80 per cent of
all products traded between its members were no longer subject to tariffs, the main exceptions
being sensitive products such as textiles, steel and automobiles.
9
In recent years, the MERCOSUR countries have substantially reduced their external tariffs.
This is largely due to domestic trade policy reforms in the last decade or so, but, to some
extent, it also reflects the adoption of the CET. It should be noted that Brazil’s average tariff
                                               
7 In any event, Baldwin (1997) has pointed out (in relation to Yeats’ study) that although trade volume changes are suggestive of
welfare changes, the former are not a sufficient condition for the latter, except under restrictive assumptions. On this, see
Baldwin and Venables (1995).
8 Argentina and Brazil started the process of regional integration somewhat earlier than the other two countries. Some tariff
preferences were included in the twenty-four bilateral trade protocols signed by Argentina and Brazil between 1984 and 1989. At
the end of 1990, the two countries signed an agreement to systemize and deepen these bilateral protocols.  At around the same
time, Paraguay and Uruguay expressed an interest in participating in the bilateral process already underway and the four
countries then decided to sign an agreement to create a common market. A full description of the trade regime of the
MERCOSUR countries is beyond the scope of this paper. For recent analyses, see WTO Secretariat (1996, 1997) and Laird
(1997).
9 Apparently, some 95 per cent of intra-MERCOSUR trade was duty free by this time (WTO Secretariat, 1996).7
stood at 51 per cent in 1988, but in recent years this has fallen from 21.2 per cent (January
1992) to 14 per cent (July 1993) and 11.9 per cent in 1995. Similarly, Argentina’s tariff
averaged some 30 per cent in 1989, but in recent years has fallen from 12.2 per cent in 1991
to 10.5 in 1995.
10 Olarreaga and Soloaga (1997) note that “the larger members of
MERCOSUR are adjusting downwards to the CET . . . which signals not only a liberalizing
effort, but also that the region will tend, on average, to be more open”.
11
This general trend towards increased PXOWLODWHUDOopenness can be seen from Table 2. The
figures show that both average tariff protection and the coverage of non-tariff barriers in the
MERCOSUR countries fell substantially over the period 1985 to 1995. The greater part of
this increase in multilateral openness occurred between 1985 and 1991-92. However, it can
also be seen that the beginning of intra-MERCOSUR liberalization, which occurred around
1991-92, was accompanied by a further reduction of trade barriers applied on a multilateral
basis.
The MERCOSUR CET has 11 tariff levels, ranging (until recently) from 0 to 20 per cent, and
applies to approximately 85 per cent of items.
12 The remaining items, including capital goods,
telecommunications equipment and computer products, are subject to national tariffs until the
end of a transition period lasting up to 2006, with a timetable of convergence to the CET
applying. Furthermore, each country is allowed a list of up to 300 exemptions from the CET
(399 in the case of Paraguay), which are again subject to a process of convergence.
Laird (1997) reports that external tariffs averaged some 10.7 per cent at the time of
implementation of the CET, but that tariff escalation affords a significant degree of HIIHFWLYH
SURWHFWLRQ to processing industries. Effective protection measures the effects of a tariff system
on value-added in different industries, given that tariffs on inputs are often lower than those
on final goods. In this case, the nominal tariff can be a misleading indicator of protection. In
Brazil, the production-weighted average rate of effective protection was apparently 12.9 per
cent in December 1995. The highest rate of effective protection was afforded to cars, trucks
and buses (in excess of 270 per cent), reflecting the high nominal tariffs on motor vehicles
                                               
10 The effect is even greater for Uruguay, which had average tariffs in excess of 100 per cent at the end of the 1970s. Note that
Paraguay is the exception, in that its average tariff was lower than under MERCOSUR, and, in any event, it may not have been
very efficient at collecting tax revenue pre-MERCOSUR. However, its share in total trade is quite small. Information on
MERCOSUR countries’ tariffs is taken from WTO Secretariat (1996) and Laird (1997).
11 Olarreaga and Soloaga (1997), p21. One should note that non-tariff barriers have also been reduced significantly in recent
years. See, for example, Edwards (1994), Rajapatirana (1994) and Laird (1995).
12 There are also various national import charges applied by individual countries. For example, Argentina applied until recently a
3 per cent “statistical tax” on non-MERCOSUR imports.8
and the relatively low-value added in the industry. Other areas benefiting from high effective
protection include electrical materials, electronic equipment, the dairy industry, beverages and
food products, textiles and plastics. On the other hand, effective rates of protection are
considerably below average in non-fuel mining, agriculture and chemicals.
The automobile industry deserves special mention, as this is clearly a “sensitive” sector, at
least as far as Brazil is concerned. The sector is, in fact, the most highly assisted
manufacturing industry in Brazil (WTO Secretariat, 1996). Special arrangements, which are
not technically part of MERCOSUR, serve to allow managed trade in this sector between
Argentina and Brazil. These arrangements provide for local content plans, concessional entry
for vehicles and parts and export-balancing requirements. Laird notes that in order to comply
with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), it will be
necessary to eliminate the local content and export-balancing requirements by the year 2000.
Brazil has Latin America’s largest vehicle parts industry, and there is clearly scope for intra-
industry trade accompanied by greater outsourcing of supplies. However, there is also a
concern that high tariff protection in this sector can lead to over-investment and excess
capacity. In 1997, MFN tariffs on imports of motor cars were as high as 30 per cent in
Argentina and 63 per cent in Brazil.
13
Even if the MERCOSUR countries can assuage concerns about trade diversion, there are
clearly areas where continued reform is required. Three such areas are worth noting here.
Firstly, the flexibility granted to individual countries in deviating from the CET does not
encourage certainty or transparency in policy formulation, and may tend to support the view
that the distributive interests of sectoral lobbies are more important than general welfare and
efficiency considerations.
14 The automobile sector is an obvious example, and a move away
from managed trade in motor vehicles should be a policy priority.
15 Individual exemptions
from the CET also fuel concerns that MERCOSUR is not yet a fully fledged customs union.
Secondly, whilst the Uruguay Round resulted in a considerable increase in tariff bindings,
these are generally considerably above applied levels.
16 The room for manoeuvre to raise
                                               
13 Source: EU Market Access Database. NB these figures do not reflect the increase in tariffs announced in November 1997.
14 Olarreaga and Soloaga (1997) use an endogenous tariff model to explain MERCOSUR countries’ deviations from the CET in
terms of the influence of sectoral lobbies.
15 In March 1998, Brazil reached an agreement with the US to accelerate the dismantling of trade-distorting investment
requirements in the automobiles sector. Some IMF Directors had already called for a reduction in the protection provided to the
motor industry in the IMF Article IV consultation with Brazil (‘IMF calls on MERCOSUR to cut tariff’, )LQDQFLDO￿7LPHV￿￿16
March 1998). It remains to be seen what will happen to tariffs once these measures have been dismantled.
16 In the case of Brazil, tariff bindings are generally at a rate of 35 per cent for manufactured products and 55 per cent for
agricultural goods (WTO Secretariat, 1996).9
applied tariffs within tariff ceilings also reduces the degree of certainty which one can attach
to MERCOSUR trade policy. Finally, economic difficulties affecting the MERCOSUR
countries have also given rise to periodic tariff adjustments.
17 Trade taxes are obviously an
important source of revenue for these countries, but a reform of domestic taxes could allow a
further reduction in tariffs.
7UDGHGLYHUVLRQWKHQHHGWRORRNDWLPSRUWV
Empirical researchers wishing to evaluate regional integration schemes must obviously
confront the difficult question of how to disentangle the effect of any scheme from the myriad
of other factors which may alter trade flows. The two main methodologies which researchers
have used are econometric techniques and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. As
Baldwin and Venables (1995) note, there are problems with both approaches. Econometric
evaluations, for example, have an advantage in that they can be appraised with standard
statistical techniques. On the other hand, they cannot capture the complicated interplay of
effects which may be important for large policy changes associated with the formation or
deepening of important regional arrangements. CGE models allow for more interplay between
endogenous variables, but neither the models nor the results can be judged statistically and the
models face a trade-off between transparency and complexity.
In his paper, Yeats  proposed a new methodology for evaluating regional schemes. He used an
index of regional orientation to examine whether individual products are more or less likely to
be traded with partner countries compared to the rest of the world. He combined this index
with different measures of apparent comparative advantage, to see whether partner countries
could be considered relatively efficient suppliers of these products. Comparing these two
measures led Yeats to the conclusion that MERCOSUR had resulted in a significant amount
of trade diversion. MERCOSUR producers had not established themselves as efficient
suppliers of many of the goods which were increasingly traded between the four countries.
In his study, Yeats noted that “it is likely . . . that trade arrangements both created and
diverted trade”.
18 However, he focused on trade diversion alone. He looked at the most
                                               
17 During the 1990s, Brazil has been plagued by current account deficits and both Argentina and Brazil have suffered from
periodic fiscal difficulties. Thus, in March 1995, in the wake of the Mexican economic crisis, Argentina launched a fiscal
adjustment programme. As well as the restoration of the 3 per cent statistical tax on non-MERCOSUR imports, Argentina also
raised tariffs on capital goods and telecommunications equipment. In April of the same year, Brazil also undertook a number of
emergency measures, such as raising tariffs on automobiles and durable consumer goods, and temporarily broadening the list of
exceptions to the CET to 450 products. In November 1997, Brazil and Argentina decided to raise the CET by 3 per cent.
Argentina simultaneously abolished the statistical tax.
18 Yeats (1997), p29.10
dynamic products in intra-MERCOSUR H[SRUWV and asked whether the four countries were
also able to export these products to third countries. A problem with this approach is that the
pattern of demand in different markets can differ, as can the structure of protection. More
substantially, we should note that, by focusing on trends in exports one can fail to capture the
important growth in trade with third countries which MERCOSUR countries have
experienced. The growth in MERCOSUR’s total imports has greatly exceeded the growth in
its total exports in recent years. Imports increased by 268 per cent compared to 129 per cent
for exports over the period 1986 to 1995. By concentrating on the share of intra-MERCOSUR
exports in total exports (rather than the share of intra-MERCOSUR imports in total imports),
one may therefore tend to overstate the relative importance of growing trade between the
MERCOSUR countries and underestimate their growing trade with the rest of the world. In
relation to Yeats’ study, this point has previously been made by Devlin (1996).
Furthermore, by focusing on exports, one may also risk overstating the importance of capital-
intensive goods in intra-MERCOSUR trade. Yeats found that capital-intensive goods featured
heavily in intra-MERCOSUR H[SRUWV. He regarded this as a cause for concern, “since
economic theory holds that countries like those in MERCOSUR should not have a
comparative advantage in the production of relatively capital-intensive goods”.
19 However,
empirical researchers who have studied how the direction of trade can affect the pattern of
trade have found that, in general, “developing countries’ exports to other developing countries
are more capital-intensive than their exports to industrial countries”
20, whilst their imports
from other developing countries tend to be OHVV capital-intensive than their imports from
developed countries. This feature of developing countries’ trade could be partly the result of
policy distortions, but it may also be somewhat intuitive, and as such there have also been
attempts to explain it within the general framework of traditional Heckscher-Ohlin trade
theory.
21
Finally, if we are studying developing countries, it is likely that raw materials and agricultural
products (for which price fluctuations may be relatively important) will tend to feature more
heavily in their exports than in their imports and that the reverse will tend to be true for
manufactured goods (for which price fluctuations will be relatively less important). Therefore,
                                               
19 Yeats (1997), p15.
20 Havrylyshyn (1987), p27.
21 Key references are Krueger (1970), Baldwin (1979) and Deardorff (1987).11
an analysis which focuses on exports may be more sensitive to price fluctuations than one
which concentrates on imports.
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Tables 3.A and 3.B show that there has been an increase in the relative importance of
MERCOSUR in the total imports of the two larger economies over the period 1988 to 1996.
Argentina and Brazil are the two largest markets within MERCOSUR and they also represent
the two main sources of intra-MERCOSUR imports. It is therefore not unreasonable to
presume that if significant amounts of trade diversion have arisen under MERCOSUR, it is
mainly in these two countries’ trade with each other. The share of the other MERCOSUR
countries in the imports of Argentina increased modestly over this period from 22 per cent to
25 per cent. Thus, although Argentina’s imports from Brazil grew by an annual average rate
of 24 per cent between 1988 and 1996, there was also strong growth in imports from other
main trading partners (e.g. NAFTA: 23%; EU: 19%; Chile: 18%). The share of other
MERCOSUR countries in Brazil’s imports more than doubled between 1988 and 1996.
Whilst Brazil’s imports from Argentina grew by an annual average rate of 33 per cent,
imports from other main trading partners also performed well (NAFTA: 19%; EU: 19%; Rest
of Western Hemisphere: 17%).
Since there has been an appreciable growth in both countries’ total imports over this period,
the aggregate figures in Tables 3.A and 3.B tend not to support the view that regional
integration between Argentina and Brazil over this period has been at the expense of trade
with other main trading partners. It is, of course, difficult to say what would have happened to
the regional evolution of these countries’ imports over this period had the regional trade
preferences not been granted. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the imports of all
developing countries from the world grew by an annual average rate of 12 per cent between
1988 and 1996, which is less than the growth in world imports by Argentina and Brazil over
this period. Of course, Brazil’s import surge may also be partly explained by the over-
valuation of the exchange rate, a consequence of the 3ODQR5HDO stabilization package.
Tables 3.C and 3.D show that, for the two smaller MERCOSUR economies, Paraguay and
Uruguay, the share of intra-regional trade in total trade is much greater (around 45 per cent).
In other words, “the importance of MERCOSUR as a source of imports decreases as country
                                               
22 For developed countries, on the other hand, raw materials and primary goods will feature relatively more in imports than in
exports. Sapir (1992) makes this point in his analysis of intra-EU trade.12
size increases”.
23 Again, however, regional integration under MERCOSUR was accompanied
by increased trade with third countries.
Table 4 reports the ratio of imports from MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR countries in
each member country’s GDP for 1988 and 1995. These figures confirm Yeats’ finding of a
strong growth in MERCOSUR intra-trade. Note, however, that the figures also record an
increased PXOWLODWHUDO openness of the MERCOSUR economies over this period. The
MERCOSUR countries recorded an important increase in the share of H[WUD-regional imports
in GDP. The only exception is Uruguay, where the share of imports from the rest of the world
was unchanged at 11 per cent.
This analysis of the regional evolution of MERCOSUR imports suggests that even if trade
diversion has been important for certain products, there has nevertheless been a strong growth
in total imports from the rest of the world. Laird characterizes the growth of MERCOSUR
imports from third countries as “impressive” and suggests that “the growth of intra-trade
cannot be attributed uniquely to trade diversion resulting from the creation of MERCOSUR
as, apart from certain years and partners, trade has also been growing strongly with other
countries”.
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7KHVKLIWLQJUHJLRQDORULHQWDWLRQRILQWUD0(5&2685LPSRUWV
This section seeks to identify a list of products in each country’s imports which may have
been the subject of trade diversion. For present purposes, trade diversion may be considered
to have arisen when two conditions have been met: (1) imports from MERCOSUR sources of
a given product have displaced imports from the rest of the world to a significant degree; and
(2) there are good reasons to believe that MERCOSUR producers are not relatively efficient
suppliers of that product. In this section, the focus is on identifying products which meet the
first of these conditions.
A useful way of identifying imports where MERCOSUR producers have displaced producers
from  the rest of the world is to adapt the index of regional orientation (RO) suggested by
Yeats to look at imports. This index should provide a useful tool for the empirical researcher
who is interested in analyzing the shifting geographical composition of trade in particular
products. One can agree with Yeats that changes in this index in the short to medium term are
more likely to be influenced by differential changes in trade barriers than factors such as
                                               
23 Foders (1996), p7.
24 Laird (1997), p2.13
shifting comparative advantage or tastes. The index of regional orientation of a given
country’s  LPSRUWV of product L, 52L, is defined as follows:
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where 
3
L P  and 
7
L P  represent the value of imports of product L from MERCOSUR partners
and from third countries, respectively, and 0
3 and 0
7 represent total imports from
MERCOSUR partners and from third countries, respectively. The index value ranges between
zero and infinity, with a value of unity indicating the same tendency to import the product
from MERCOSUR partners as from third countries and values above unity indicating a
greater tendency to do so.
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The problem with using the regional orientation index to identify products where trade
diversion may have arisen is that there may be other reasons why imports from MERCOSUR
producers have displaced imports from the rest of the world. For example, increased
competition within MERCOSUR and ongoing structural reforms in these countries may have
stimulated greater intra-regional trade flows. Additionally, product differentiation may be
important and the increased regional orientation of imports of a given good may partly reflect
the demand for increased variety, some of which is now being met from regional sources.
Furthermore, the case for trade diversion can only really be convincing when imports from
MERCOSUR sources have replaced imports from the rest of the world to a significant degree.
Relatively minor changes in import shares in the short- to medium-term might be quite
normal, e.g. because of fluctuations in real exchange rates. This suggests that the RO index
needs to be interpreted with some caution.
Tables 5.A., B., C. and D. report values of 52L￿ ￿ for the top thirty products in each
MERCOSUR country’s imports which meet these two selection criteria: (a) they show an
increase in regional orientation over recent periods; and, (b) imports from MERCOSUR
sources exceeded $1 million at the end of the period considered. Selection criterion (b) was
introduced, as in Yeats’ study, in order to exclude marginal products. Note that time periods
                                               
25 According to his equation (2), Yeats scaled his RO variable by 100. This cannot be correct since he says that a value of XQLW\
(not 100) indicates the same tendency to export a product to MERCOSUR markets as to the rest of the world, and values above
XQLW\ (again, not 100) indicate a greater tendency to do so.14
vary according to importing country because of differences in the availability of data.
26 As in
Yeats’ study, products were classified according to the Standard Industrial Trade
Classification (SITC) system, and disaggregated at the 3-digit level. The products listed
account for between 76 per cent (Uruguay) and 97 per cent (Brazil) of the increase in regional
orientation of MERCOSUR imports over the periods considered.
For Argentina, most of the increase in the regional orientation of imports from MERCOSUR
sources was concentrated in the chemical products, manufactured goods and machinery and
transport equipment categories. For Brazil, food and live animals featured most prominently,
followed by manufactured goods and machinery and transport equipment. For Paraguay, the
products showing an increase in regional orientation of imports from MERCOSUR were
concentrated in the manufactured goods, food and live animals and chemical products
categories. For Uruguay, the most important categories were food and live animals,
machinery and transport equipment, chemical products and manufactured goods.
At a more detailed level, the products with an increased tendency of being imported from
MERCOSUR partners compared to third countries were somewhat of a mixed picture. Both
higher value-added products (e.g. telecommunications equipment, motor vehicles) and more
traditional developing-country exports (e.g. agricultural products, textiles, clothing, footwear)
appear to have shifted towards MERCOSUR sources in recent years. In general, however, the
results are not out of line with what is known about the intra-trade of the MERCOSUR
countries before they began to undertake both significant preferential trade liberalization and
unilateral, non-discriminatory reductions in trade barriers. As Baumann (1993) noted,
“If we look at the most important trade flows, we find that in 1989
Argentina’s main exports within MERCOSUR consisted of wheat, dairy
products, fruits and nuts, petroleum products, and motor vehicle parts.
Brazil exported coffee, iron ore and concentrates, petroleum products,
steel products and automobiles. Uruguay mainly exported meat, rice,
processed cereals and some chemical products such as pigments and
paints, while the principal Paraguayan exports were cotton, meat, coffee
and essential oils.”
27
                                               
26 The analysis is based on data available for the most recent period possible as reported by each country according to the SITC
Rev. 3 classification. The exact period therefore differs by country.
27 Baumann(1993), p136.15
Many of these products occur in the list of goods showing an increase in regional orientation
favouring MERCOSUR. Of course, this tells us which products were being exported by each
MERCOSUR country to its partners. What about LPSRUWV? In 1989, Argentina’s main imports
from other MERCOSUR countries consisted of iron ore and concentrates, ingots and other
primary forms of iron and steel, motor vehicle parts and accessories, other hydrocarbons and
coffee and coffee substitutes. Brazil imported cotton, wheat, leather, meat and edible meat
offal and fruit and nuts. Uruguay mainly imported passenger motor cars, polymerization
products, refined petroleum products, iron and steel plates and sheets and telecommunications
equipment. The main Paraguayan imports were refined petroleum products, tractors, rubber
tyres, polymerization products and paper and paperboard. Again, many of these products
feature in the list of goods which have been identified as showing an increase in regional
orientation favouring MERCOSUR.
Thus, both for traditional developing-country exports and for higher value-added products, an
important part of the recent increase in the regional orientation of MERCOSUR imports is
explained by goods which were already being traded relatively intensively between the four
countries before major intra-bloc trade barriers were lifted.
In order to provide a convincing argument that the products in Tables 5.A. to D. have shifted
towards MERCOSUR sources as a result of trade diversion, it needs to be established that
MERCOSUR producers cannot be considered to be relatively efficient suppliers. This issue
will be examined in the next section.
,GHQWLI\LQJWKHFRPSDUDWLYHDGYDQWDJHRIWKH0(5&2685FRXQWULHV
Yeats’ analysis was based on the traditional factor-proportions (Heckscher-Ohlin) theory of
comparative advantage, which explains relative efficiency in the production of different
goods on the basis of differences in countries’ relative endowments of different factors of
production. The theory states that countries will have a comparative advantage in producing
those goods which use intensively the factors of production with which they are relatively
more endowed. Countries which are labour-abundant (i.e. developing countries), will tend to
be relatively efficient at producing goods which are labour-intensive in production, and
similarly for capital-abundant (i.e. developed) countries.
The factor-proportions theory is intuitively appealing and has stood up remarkably well to
empirical scrutiny. Deardorff (1984) provides a survey of empirical tests of the theory. He
concludes that “it does reasonably well at explaining the commodity composition of trade, but
beyond that it is fairly helpless. We need something more, or different, even to address issues16
of the bilateral pattern and volume of trade. If we wish our model to be consistent with . . .
empirical observations [e.g. on the importance of trade between countries with similar factor
endowments], a more radical departure from the . . . model may be called for.”
28
A problem with the traditional theory, then, is that it says very little about the directionof
trade. Why should Argentina’s exports to Brazil necessarily be the same as its exports to rest
of the world? Yeats found that “dynamic products [in intra-MERCOSUR trade] generally
consist of goods that are relatively capital-intensive in fabrication”
29. As has already been
noted, however, developing countries’ exports to other developing countries tend to be more
capital-intensive than their exports to developed countries, and their imports from other
developing countries are less so (although it may be that trade policy distortions reinforce this
effect).
Yeats did not provide any information on relative endowments of factors of production in the
MERCOSUR countries, but one way to proxy this is to look at their relative income levels. It
seems reasonable to assume that richer countries have higher relative endowments of physical
and human capital and that poorer countries have higher relative endowments of labour. On
the basis of per capita income levels, the World Bank classifies the MERCOSUR countries
(with the exception of Paraguay) as “upper-middle-income”. This tends to suggest that the
MERCOSUR countries lie somewhere in between the developed countries and the rest of the
developing world in terms of their relative factor endowments. In other words, they might be
higher up the ladder of comparative advantage than the average developing country (relative
endowments of physical and human capital might be greater than for the average developing
country) but still below developed countries (relative endowments of labour are still greater
than in the developed world).
This makes the identification of the comparative advantage of the MERCOSUR countries
somewhat difficult. As developing countries, they should tend to have a comparative
advantage in the production of relatively labour-intensive products. However, since per capita
incomes are higher in the MERCOSUR countries than in the developing world on average,
these countries may also have an emerging specialization in some relatively higher value-
added products.
                                               
28 Deardorff (1984), p512.
29 Yeats (1997), p15.17
Empirical researchers have long struggled with the problem of identifying different countries’
comparative advantages. Perhaps one of the most well known contributions to this area is the
index of UHYHDOHG FRPSDUDWLYH DGYDQWDJH (RCA), developed by Balassa (1965). The
calculation of this index does not depend on relative factor endowments, but rather on the
ratio of the share of a good in a country’s exports to the share of that good in total world
exports. Values above (below) unity indicate that a country has (does not have) an apparent
comparative advantage (or export specialization) in a given product. The traditional (Balassa)
RCA index for product LcountryMis calculated as the ratio of the share of L in M’s total exports
to the share of that product in world trade (world exports of L as a proportion of total world
exports), i.e.
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Yeats calculated a slightly different version of this index, by excluding intra-bloc trade from
both the numerator and the denominator.
30 He did this in order to prevent preferential trading
arrangements within MERCOSUR from biasing the results. He wanted to measure countries’
WUXH abilities to export products in markets where they do not benefit from an “unnatural”
edge (which MERCOSUR’s CET would give them). Whilst this is a valid concern, which
must give rise to difficulties with the interpretation of the Balassa version of the RCA index,
there are also problems with the approach favoured by Yeats. Firstly, MERCOSUR exporters
may also benefit from preferential treatment in important third country markets (although, in
general, third-countries’ MFN tariffs will not give MERCOSUR exporters the same degree of
“unnatural” edge which they might enjoy under MERCOSUR’s CET). Secondly, and more
importantly, if intra-bloc trade in certain goods is the main motivation for the development of
new export industries (as may be the case in motor vehicle parts), or if an important number
of MERCOSUR firms already specialize in supplying the needs of regional markets (for
example, Uruguayan exports of cereal preparations are almost exclusively destined for
Brazil), then removing these markets from the calculation of the index can tend to understate
a country’s revealed comparative advantage. Tastes can also differ in different markets, and it
might be that intra-regional differences in tastes are less important than differences between
MERCOSUR and the rest of the world. Alternatively, for some products, intra-regional
                                               
30 Given the small share of the MERCOSUR countries in world trade, excluding intra-bloc trade from the denominator does not
greatly affect the value of this index.18
transport costs may be low enough for MERCOSUR producers to be considered efficient
suppliers of local markets relative to extra-regional suppliers.
31
More generally, if direction matters for trade, it is not clear that “regionalizing” revealed
comparative advantage in this manner is appropriate. Since one expects MERCOSUR exports
to developed countries (who make up the greater part of world trade) to be less capital-
intensive than their exports to each other, the products with increased regional orientation
might ordinarily have higher values for the Balassa version of the index than for the Yeats
version. Furthermore, if MERCOSUR exporters face important trade barriers in third-country
markets which are less important for intra-MERCOSUR trade, the Yeats version can also
understate these countries’ revealed comparative advantage.
32 Yeats did not provide any
empirical support for his contention that his version of the RCA index is superior to that
suggested by Balassa (e.g. application to the study of other regional trading arrangements),
and one may therefore express legitimate doubts as to its general validity.
On the other hand, the problem with the Balassa version, as Yeats pointed out, is that it may
be artificially biased by the trade regime created under MERCOSUR. This problem might be
eliminated by calculating RCAs for the period before MERCOSUR was formed. Even then,
however, the index may be biased because of pre-MERCOSUR trade policy distortions.
Perhaps the best that can be done is to compare the different versions of the RCA index over
different periods of time. This is done in Tables 6.A. to D.
,GHQWLI\LQJSRVVLEOHWUDGHGLYHUVLRQ
Tables 6.A. to D. indicate whether the RCA indices (both the Balassa and Yeats versions) for
each MERCOSUR country’s main regional suppliers are above unity for each of the products
previously identified as showing an increase in regional orientation.
Thus, if, for example, one is interested in Argentina’s imports, the table shows whether the
RCA index for Brazil, Paraguay or Uruguay (depending on which of these countries is an
important supplier to the Argentine market) is above unity and therefore whether one can
consider MERCOSUR producers to be relatively efficient suppliers of a given product. Both
                                               
31 One should note, however, that Amjadi and Winters (1997) found that, in general, intra-MERCOSUR transport margins are
probably not large enough for MERCOSUR to be able to reap large gains as a “natural” trading bloc.
32 Historically, this may have been the case for many products in which the MERCOSUR countries might have a comparative
advantage (e.g. agricultural products, or textiles and clothing). Industrial countries have traditionally imposed significant
restrictions on Latin American exports, often in the form of non-tariff barriers. Edwards (1994) reports that import-weighted non-19
versions of the index were calculated over different periods: the average for the period 1988-
90 (before MERCOSUR) and 1995 (most recent available data). Finally, the Tables give
figures, where available, for an index of capital-intensity. This provides an H[DQWH measure of
comparative advantage (in contrast to the RCA index, which is an H[SRVW measure). It is
based on the assumption that one can proxy the capital-intensity of production of different
goods in a given country by using figures for value-added per worker (generally considered to
be a good measure of human and physical capital-intensity) in US manufacturing. A value of
100 indicates that the good is as capital-intensive as the average for US manufacturing, while
values above (below) 100 indicate goods which are more (less) capital-intensive relative to
this average.
Are there strong reasons for believing that the shift in regional orientation of MERCOSUR
countries’ imports is associated with products for which significant trade diversion has
arisen? In fact, this is far from straightforward. Different measures of comparative advantage
often yield quite different results. For example, looking at Brazil’s imports, it can be seen that
Argentina has a revealed comparative advantage in the production of live animals when
measured by the Balassa RCA index. However, if the MERCOSUR market is excluded, the
Yeats version of the RCA index shows Argentina QRW to have a revealed comparative
advantage. The explanation for the discrepancy in the two indices may lie in the fact that trade
in live animals, such as bovine cattle, may be restricted to the region because of high transport
costs.
33 As noted earlier, a major weakness of the Yeats version of the RCA index is that there
are factors other than preferential trade barriers which may explain why a product is mainly
shipped to regional markets.
Consider now the products with an increased regional orientation in the imports of Argentina.
For fifteen of the thirty most important products shown in Table 6.A., none of the main
regional suppliers of the Argentine market (usually Brazil), had a Balassa RCA above unity in
1988-90. However, if one were to eliminate those products for which either: (a) any one of
the main regional suppliers had a Balassa RCA above unity in 1995 (it may have developed a
specialization in the product over this period); or, (b) any one of the main regional suppliers
had a Yeats RCA above unity in either 1988-90 or 1995, one is left with only nine products.
Three of these products can be eliminated, since they seem to be relatively labour-intensive.
This leaves only six products. However, from Table 5.A., it can be seen that the average
                                                                                                                                      
tariff barrier coverage ratios in OECD markets in the mid-1980s were 63 per cent for Argentina and 38 per cent for Brazil. The
Uruguay Round should significantly improve the prospects for Latin America’s exports to the industrial countries.
33 Gupta and Schiff (1997), p6.20
annual growth rate of Argentine imports from third countries for these six products has been
between 12.9 per cent (automatic data processing machines) and 31.7 per cent (polyacetals) in
recent years.
Performing a similar exercise for Brazil in Table 6.B., one again starts with fifteen products
for which none of its main regional suppliers had a Balassa RCA above unity in 1988-90.
Again, eliminating those products for which one of the other measures of RCA is above unity
or which could be considered labour-intensive, one is left with around ten products.
34 It will
be seen that only two of these products (transmission shafts and non-ferrous base metal
waste) are associated with declining imports from third countries. For the other eight
products, Brazil’s imports from third countries have again been growing very strongly over
recent years. Annual average growth rates for imports from third countries range from 7.1 per
cent (taps, cocks and valves) to 22.2 per cent (polymers of styrene).
For Paraguay, there are only six products which cannot be eliminated on the basis of either
version of the RCA index for either period or the capital-intensity index. For only one of these
products (fertilizers) have Paraguayan imports from third countries fallen in recent periods.
Annual average growth rates of imports from third countries for the other five products have
ranged from 12.5 per cent (alcoholic beverages) to 24.3 per cent (motor cars). For Uruguay,
there are only two products which cannot be eliminated on the basis of RCA indices or
capital-intensity. Uruguayan imports of these two products (medicaments and soap) from
third countries have been growing by, on average, at least fifteen per cent over recent periods.
Two conclusions may be drawn from the above analysis. First, it is important to focus on
imports rather than exports. For most of the products which have shown an increase in
regional orientation towards MERCOSUR suppliers, imports from third countries have also
been growing strongly. This observation is difficult to square with the view that MERCOSUR
has been associated with a significant amount of welfare-reducing trade diversion. Second,
the identification of trade diversion is not straightforward. There are difficulties with the
interpretation of the different measures of comparative advantage. However, if one were to
look for strong evidence of trade diversion by using all the various indicators together, one
would find only a handful of products in the imports of each country. Even for these products,
there has been an impressive increase in imports from third countries. In most cases, the
annual average growth rate of third country imports exceeds 10 per cent over the periods
                                               
34 It seems reasonable to exclude cut articles of paper, since this could be either a labour-intensive or a capital-intensive product
on the basis of figures reported in Yeats (1989).21
examined. Of course, one cannot say what would have happened to the growth of imports
from outside MERCOSUR had the four countries not eliminated barriers to trade with each
other whilst maintaining some protection against third countries. Trade diversion has
undoubtedly occurred for some products, but the increasing multilateral openness of the
MERCOSUR countries coupled with the dynamic effects of the growth in their economies’
may have outweighed any static welfare losses. Furthermore, there may well be reasons other
than trade diversion which explain why imports of these products have shown an increase in
regional orientation favouring MERCOSUR.
7UDGHEDUULHUVLQ0(5&2685FRXQWULHV
Table 7  reports post-Uruguay Round applied tariffs for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, as
well as for the US, the EU and a selection of countries in East Asia and the Pacific. The
figures were taken from Finger, Ingco and Reincke (1996). Also shown is the proportion of
trade covered by non-tariff barriers for the period 1990-93 (i.e. pre-Uruguay Round figures).
These were taken from World Bank (1997).
In his paper, Yeats argued that the combination of high tariff preferences favouring
MERCOSUR partners and non-tariff barriers applied to third country imports played an
important part in explaining the recent dynamism of intra-MERCOSUR exports. He noted
that tariff margins for these products are “far higher than the average within the European
Union” and that “non-tariff barriers were also structured along lines that would reinforce the
trade distorting effects of the agreements (sic) preferential tariffs”.
35  Of course, developing
countries tend to have higher levels of external protection than those of industrial countries.
The comparison with the EU is useful, since it represents a good example of how regional
integration can be successfully combined with increasing multilateral openness. Nevertheless,
one should not lose sight of the fact that MERCOSUR is an arrangement among developing
countries. A more useful comparison is therefore one involving other developing countries.
What is important to remember is that the MERCOSUR countries started with high levels of
external protection and have since undertaken dramatic, unilateral liberalizations of their trade
regimes. It is true that Latin American countries do not have trade regimes which are as open
as those in the industrialized countries, but it should nevertheless be noted that, on average,
“Latin America now has lower tariff protection than other developing regions . . . [and that]
non-tariff barriers for all products other than fuel are quite moderate and on the whole lower
                                               
35 Yeats (1997), pp26-28.22
than in the industrialized countries”.
36 Table 7 shows that the level of non-tariff protection in
the three largest MERCOSUR countries compares favourably with that in the US or the EU.
In addition, both tariff and non-tariff protection is, in general, lower than in developing
countries in East Asia and the Pacific.
7KHWHFKQRORJ\FRQWHQWRI0(5&2685LPSRUWV
Theories of trade based on differences in technology provide an alternative framework to the
Heckscher-Ohlin approach.
37 It is interesting to ask whether there has been a shift in the
technology content of imports from intra- and extra-MERCOSUR sources in recent years.
This may provide further insights as to whether MERCOSUR has generated significant trade
diversion.
Foders (1996) suggests that the MERCOSUR countries are specialized in the production of
standard technology products, with perhaps an emerging specialization in a number of
intermediate technology products (e.g. rubber manufactures). On the other hand,
MERCOSUR countries are unlikely to be the most efficient suppliers of each other’s imports
of high technology products. As Foders notes, intra-MERCOSUR trade “can only be a part of
[the] total foreign trade of MERCOSUR member states; imports of embodied and
disembodied technology and know-how, which will be necessary to achieve high and
sustainable rates of economic growth, will continue to originate in the OECD countries”.
38
Therefore, if there has been any shift in these countries’ imports of high technology goods
towards intra-MERCOSUR sources in recent periods, this may lend support to the view that
trade policy changes introduced by the MERCOSUR countries may have encourage
inefficient intra-regional trade flows.
Tables 8.A. and B. show that, Argentina and Brazil depend on non-MERCOSUR sources for
almost all their imports of high technology products. For Argentina, there does not seem to
have been much of a shift in the share of imports from MERCOSUR and third countries when
classified by technology content.
39 For Brazil, the most noticeable development is an increase
in MERCOSUR’s share of imports of intermediate technology goods, from 6 per cent in 1989
to 12 per cent in 1995. However, the rest of the world still accounts for by far the greater part
of Brazil’s imports of such goods.
                                               
36 UNCTAD (1993), p114-115.
37 Again, see Deardorff (1984) for a survey of empirical tests of technology-oriented theories of trade.
38 Foders (1996), p16.
39 The classification is based on that used by Foders (1996) in a previous study of MERCOSUR trade. See Annexe 1.23
Any shift in technology content is more noticeable for the smaller countries than for the larger
countries. The rest of the world’s share in Argentina’s and Brazil’s imports of high
technology goods has not changed much over the periods examined. On the other hand,
Tables 8.C and D. show that the rest of the world’s share in Paraguay’s and Uruguay’s
imports of high technology goods increased, while the other MERCOSUR countries increased
their share in these two countries’ imports of standard technology goods.
One can also apply this classification of goods by technology content to the products
identified by Yeats as featuring prominently in intra-MERCOSUR exports. In his Table 4,
Yeats lists the thirty products which have grown fastest in intra-regional exports. His Table 5
shows the thirty products where there has been the greatest increase in regional orientation
towards MERCOSUR (again, looking at exports). Of the first group of products, only two are
high technology and only five are intermediate technology. Of the second group, again only
two are high technology, whilst seven are intermediate technology. Thus, if one looks at
exports rather than imports, the recent increase in MERCOSUR trade is mainly confined to
standard technology products and a handful of intermediate products. This is not out of line
with the prior assumption that these countries should tend to be specialized in the production
of such goods.
Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that the intra-trade of the MERCOSUR countries
is not as perverse, from a technology-content point of view, as one might think. In particular,
regional integration within MERCOSUR does not seem to have seriously compromised these
countries’ imports of high technology products from outside the region. The analysis of the
regional composition of MERCOSUR imports when classified by technology does not
provide strong support for the hypothesis that intra-MERCOSUR trade flows are inefficient.
Of course, one does not know what would have happened had regional integration not taken
place. MERCOSUR may not be as good as multilateral free trade (or an equivalent degree of
liberalization on a  multilateral basis – Yeats’ counterfactual), but it may not be all bad either.
&RQFOXVLRQV
Developing countries, particularly in Latin America, have a rather poor history of forming
regional integration schemes among themselves. Yeats’ paper serves to remind us of one of
the principle concerns which have been expressed about such schemes, i.e. that they can tend
to be welfare-reducing by fostering trade diversion. However, Yeats’ analysis focused on
intra-MERCOSUR exports. As such, it failed to capture the importance of growing imports
from third countries. The growth in imports from non-MERCOSUR countries reflects the fact
that the formation of MERCOSUR has taken place at the same time as these countries were24
implementing structural reforms including a continued, multilateral opening of their
economies. In the 1960s, the regional integration efforts of Latin American countries led to
reduced trade within the region and with the rest of the world. In the 1990s, the MERCOSUR
countries have recorded both a strong surge in intra-regional trade and an impressive growth
in trade with third countries. This is hardly characteristic of a “fortress”.
The key question in examining trade diversion is whether more efficiently produced imports
from outside the region have been replaced by less efficiently produced imports from within.
The methodology followed in this paper has been to identify those products which show an
increased tendency to be imported from MERCOSUR sources compared to the rest of the
world, and then to seek to determine whether such products correspond to the presumed
comparative advantage of the MERCOSUR countries. Identifying the products which show
an increased tendency to be imported from MERCOSUR partners compared to third countries
is relatively straightforward. The Regional Orientation index suggested by Yeats is a useful
tool for the empirical researcher, and can be easily adapted to look at imports. The products
which show an increase in regional orientation towards MERCOSUR in these countries’
imports are somewhat of a mixed picture: higher value-added products are included along
with more traditional developing country exports. For both categories, many of the products
were already being traded relatively intensively between the four countries before they
undertook significant discriminatory trade liberalization.
Identifying the comparative advantage of the MERCOSUR countries is less straightforward
than Yeats suggested. These are “upper-middle-income” countries whose relative
endowments of physical and human capital are presumably well above those for the average
developing country. Thus, the view that these countries should only be exporting labour-
intensive manufactures may be somewhat simplistic. Looking at indices of revealed
comparative advantage provides an alternative approach, which is not reliant on determining
the factor endowments of MERCOSUR. On this basis, one can identify a list of products
where MERCOSUR suppliers do not have a revealed comparative advantage. For these
products, the shift towards MERCOSUR suppliers at the expense of third countries may be
suggestive of trade diversion, although this is far from obvious. For most of these products
there has also been a strong growth in imports from third countries, which suggests that
concerns about trade diversion may be exaggerated.
Since MERCOSUR is still in its infancy, it is not possible to arrive at a definitive conclusion
about its welfare implications for member countries and the rest of the world. Concerns about
the effects of regional trade arrangements on member and non-member welfare, and on the25
multilateral system more generally, are much older than MERCOSUR. The European Union
provides an example of how a regional integration scheme can be combined with increasing
multilateral openness. If the MERCOSUR countries are to emulate the EU in this respect,
they must continue to press ahead with structural reforms and continued efforts to open their
economies on a non-discriminatory basis. Argentina and Brazil are already amongst the most
important developing country markets for EU exports. Over the period 1988 to 1996, EU
exports to Argentina and Brazil grew by annual average rates of 19 per cent and 17 per cent,
respectively. In other words, discriminatory trade barriers introduced by the formation of
MERCOSUR do not seem to have seriously constrained EU exports to the region. This seems
to provide further evidence that trade creation and positive dynamic effects of multilateral
liberalization have also been present along with trade diversion.
One final point which should be made is that, although it is as yet difficult to identify
significant trade diversion as a result of the liberalization which the MERCOSUR countries
have conducted towards each other, this does not rule out the possibility that trade diversion
could arise from a free-trade agreement with the EU. MERCOSUR’s CET (and the various
national tariffs which are still in operation for certain products) are still high. There may be
important non-economic reasons for deepening the EU-MERCOSUR relationship (e.g. the
close cultural and political ties between the two regions). But if MERCOSUR countries were
to eliminate tariffs on imports from the EU whilst maintaining a high level of external
protection against third countries, the scope for trade diversion would, in principle, be quite
large. On the other hand, such adverse effects could be avoided by a non-discriminatory
reduction in trade barriers.26
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     Argentina 278,431 34,665 8,030 8,310
     Brazil 579,787 159,222 3,640 5,400
     Paraguay 8,158 4,828 1,690 3,650
     Uruguay 16,458 3,184 5,170 6,630
Chile 59,151 14,225 4,160 9,520
$QGHDQ3DFW    
     Bolivia 5,905 7,414 800 2,540
     Colombia 70,263 36,813 1,910 6,130
     Ecuador 15,997 11,447 1,390 4,220
     Peru 55,019 23,819 2,310 3,770
     Venezuela 65,382 21,671 3,020 7,900
$OODERYH    
Source: World Bank (1997). Note some figures are for years other than those specified.27
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Argentina 26.0 15.0 11.9 31.9 8.0 2.4
Brazil 80.0 21.1 12.3 35.3 10.0 2.0
Paraguay 71.7 16.0 10.2 9.9 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 32.0 12.0 10.5 14.1 0.0 0.4
Source: Edwards (1994) for 1985 and 1991-92 and UNCTAD Database on Trade Control Measures (TRAINS
version 5.0) for 1994-5. See UNCTAD (1996).28
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6RXUFH 6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1988
6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1996
$QQXDODYHUDJH
JURZWKUDWHRI
LPSRUWV
1988-1996
      Brazil 18% 23% 24%
      Paraguay/Uruguay 4% 2% 12%
0(5&2685 22% 25% 22%
1$)7$ 20% 23% 23%
5HVWRI:+HPLVSKHUH 10% 4% 9%
      of which, Chile 3% 2% 18%
(8 31% 29% 19%
5HVWRI:RUOG 16% 18% 22%
   :RUOG 100% 100% 21%
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years. Note Western Hemisphere is DoTS definition
and excludes Cuba.
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6RXUFH 6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1988
6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1996
$QQXDODYHUDJH
JURZWKUDWHRI
LPSRUWV
1988-1996
      Argentina 5% 13% 33%
      Paraguay/Uruguay 3% 3% 18%
0(5&2685 7% 15% 29%
1$)7$ 25% 26% 19%
5HVWRI:+HPLVSKHUH 5% 5% 17%
      of which, Chile 2% 2% 13%
(8 23% 26% 19%
5HVWRI:RUOG 40% 27% 12%
   :RUOG 100% 100% 18%
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years. Note Western Hemisphere is DoTS definition
and excludes Cuba.29
7DEOH&3DUDJXD\UHJLRQDOHYROXWLRQRILPSRUWV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6RXUFH 6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1988
6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1996
$QQXDODYHUDJH
JURZWKUDWHRI
LPSRUWV
1988-1996
      Argentina 12% 14% 30%
      Brazil 30% 30% 27%
0(5&2685 43% 45% 28%
1$)7$ 11% 18% 35%
5HVWRI:+HPLVSKHUH 4% 2% 21%
      of which, Chile 2% 2% 28%
(8 20% 9% 16%
5HVWRI:RUOG 23% 25% 29%
   :RUOG 100% 100% 27%
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years. Note Western Hemisphere is DoTS definition
and excludes Cuba. Note also that DoTS reports Paraguay’s imports on an fob basis.
7DEOH'8UXJXD\UHJLRQDOHYROXWLRQRILPSRUWV
6RXUFH 6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1988
6KDUHLQWRWDO
LPSRUWV
1996
$QQXDODYHUDJH
JURZWKUDWHRI
LPSRUWV
1988-1996
      Argentina 15% 21% 18%
      Brazil 26% 22% 12%
0(5&2685 42% 43% 14%
1$)7$ 14% 14% 15%
5HVWRI:+HPLVSKHUH 4% 6% 21%
      of which, Chile 2% 2% 12%
(8 25% 19% 10%
5HVWRI:RUOG 15% 17% 15%
   :RUOG 100% 100% 14%
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, various years. Note Western Hemisphere is DoTS definition
and excludes Cuba.30
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$UJHQWLQD
    Imports/GDP 6.6% 8.6%
       MERCOSUR imports/GDP 1.2% 1.9%
       Rest of the World imports/GDP 5.4% 6.7%
%UD]LO
    Imports/GDP 5.7% 8.4%
       MERCOSUR imports/GDP 0.4% 0.7%
       Rest of the World imports/GDP 5.3% 7.6%
3DUDJXD\
    Imports/GDP 36.9% 51.2%
       MERCOSUR imports/GDP 15.5% 20.2%
       Rest of the World imports/GDP 21.4% 31.0%
8UXJXD\
    Imports/GDP 19.1% 20.4%
       MERCOSUR imports/GDP   8.1%   9.4%
       Rest of the World imports/GDP 11.0% 11.0%
Source: computed from IMF ,QWHUQDWLRQDO)LQDQFLDO6WDWLVWLFV and UN COMTRADE data.7DEOH$$UJHQWLQDWRSWKLUW\LPSRUWVZLWKLQFUHDVHGUHJLRQDORULHQWDWLRQIURP0(5&2685VRXUFHV
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784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles 13.13% 3.69 4.11 399751 605987 56% 57% 11.0% 320309 455341 44% 43% 9.2%
713 internal combustion piston engines 8.26% 2.73 3.08 123055 252858 48% 50% 19.7% 133433 253951 52% 50% 17.5%
672 ingots and other primary forms, of iron or steel 3.49% 5.37 260.01 20750 75552 64% 99% 38.1% 11436 898 36% 1% -47.1%
071 coffee and coffee substitutes 3.39% 10.39 15.26 35118 88307 78% 83% 25.9% 10000 17888 22% 17% 15.6%
778 electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 3.00% 0.64 0.72 43336 90468 18% 19% 20.2% 201489 387783 82% 81% 17.8%
652 cotton fabrics, woven 2.78% 1.39 9.20 20566 64261 32% 75% 33.0% 43761 21598 68% 25% -16.2%
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape 2.64% 2.13 2.42 34284 75762 42% 44% 21.9% 47558 96778 58% 56% 19.4%
722 tractors 2.54% 2.21 3.57 14915 54873 43% 54% 38.5% 19979 47534 57% 46% 24.2%
281 iron ore and concentrates 2.53% 71.49 313.10 133192 172940 96% 99% 6.7% 5512 1707 4% 1% -25.4%
574 polyacetals, other polyethers and epoxide resins 2.29% 0.57 1.08 8038 44011 16% 26% 53.0% 41667 125429 84% 74% 31.7%
285 aluminium ores and concentrates 2.17% 1.54 4.65 17397 51504 34% 60% 31.2% 33363 34210 66% 40% 0.6%
752 automatic data processing machines 2.14% 0.15 0.31 15828 49378 5% 9% 32.9% 303724 493673 95% 91% 12.9%
772 electrical apparatus 2.04% 0.38 0.64 17440 49422 11% 17% 29.7% 136978 239610 89% 83% 15.0%
591 insecticides, rodenticides, fungicides, herbicides 2.01% 0.58 0.77 16172 47821 16% 20% 31.1% 82243 192488 84% 80% 23.7%
542 medicaments (including veterinary medicaments) 2.00% 0.24 0.50 6795 38275 7% 14% 54.1% 85377 235219 93% 86% 28.8%
334 petroleum oils and oils (bituminous) 1.97% 0.46 0.48 26625 57602 13% 13% 21.3% 173056 369144 87% 87% 20.9%
511 hydrocarbons, n.e.s. 1.97% 2.21 2.54 17502 48386 43% 45% 28.9% 23407 58974 57% 55% 26.0%
651 textile yarn 1.91% 2.26 2.82 38589 68570 43% 48% 15.5% 50483 75033 57% 52% 10.4%
733 machine-tools for working metal 1.90% 0.36 2.47 1850 31709 11% 44% 103.5% 15346 39628 89% 56% 26.8%
658 made-up articles (textiles) 1.89% 2.62 6.36 19982 49702 47% 67% 25.6% 22544 24165 53% 33% 1.8%
851 footwear 1.80% 0.62 1.73 20231 48576 17% 36% 24.5% 96868 86566 83% 64% -2.8%
821 furniture and parts thereof 1.64% 1.84 1.85 18035 43870 38% 37% 24.9% 29017 73448 62% 63% 26.1%
554 soap, cleansing and polishing preparations 1.64% 0.54 1.43 7022 32710 15% 32% 46.9% 38626 70649 85% 68% 16.3%
675 flat-rolled products of alloy steel 1.45% 0.45 1.96 8327 31073 13% 39% 39.0% 54948 48889 87% 61% -2.9%
874 measuring instruments 1.28% 0.19 0.30 8564 28632 6% 9% 35.2% 132449 293420 94% 91% 22.0%
522 inorganic chemical elements 1.24% 2.18 3.13 21656 41105 42% 50% 17.4% 29371 40586 58% 50% 8.4%
696 cutlery 1.24% 2.45 4.62 15394 34816 45% 60% 22.6% 18569 23283 55% 40% 5.8%
742 pumps for liquids 1.18% 0.58 0.75 15289 33760 16% 20% 21.9% 77846 138893 84% 80% 15.6%
771 electric power machinery 1.16% 0.05 0.52 1040 19190 2% 14% 107.3% 56435 113432 98% 86% 19.1%
533 pigments, paints, varnishes and related materials 1.14% 0.75 0.76 16073 33972 20% 20% 20.6% 63755 138716 80% 80% 21.5%
7RWDO￿RI￿DERYH￿SURGXFWV ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Source: computed from UN COMTRADE statistics. NB Regional orientation: for definition, see text.32
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048 cereal preparations and preparations of flour 31.78% 1.95 11.61 25774 852314 20% 65% 79.2% 103314 450200 80% 35% 27.8%
784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles 15.76% 1.29 2.86 50331 460200 14% 44% 44.6% 304691 578509 86% 56% 11.3%
222 oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 5.88% 1.07 19.49 2902 155723 12% 86% 94.2% 21148 25641 88% 14% 3.3%
054 vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen 5.74% 9.31 9.72 72046 221380 54% 82% 20.6% 60477 49941 46% 18% -3.1%
022 milk and cream 5.66% 3.28 6.05 64887 212164 30% 73% 21.8% 154803 77077 70% 27% -11.0%
421 fixed vegetable fats and oils 5.60% 10.98 17.82 39998 185519 58% 85% 29.1% 28484 33707 42% 15% 2.8%
044 maize (not including sweet corn) unmilled 5.30% 19.41 41.33 18682 156635 71% 93% 42.5% 7524 12689 29% 7% 9.1%
713 internal combustion piston engines 5.17% 0.71 1.73 14515 148999 8% 35% 47.4% 159859 277051 92% 65% 9.6%
001 live animals other than animals of division 03 3.21% 6.26 19.31 32970 116458 44% 83% 23.4% 41173 23792 56% 17% -8.7%
893 articles, n.e.s. of plastics 1.95% 0.61 1.08 2169 52888 7% 36% 70.3% 27865 92418 93% 64% 22.1%
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape 1.54% 0.98 2.90 1466 41443 11% 55% 74.5% 11742 33775 89% 45% 19.3%
582 plates, sheets, film, foil and strip, of plastics 1.08% 1.04 1.25 8195 36313 12% 27% 28.2% 61890 99727 88% 73% 8.3%
572 polymers of styrene, in primary forms 0.79% 0.43 1.14 485 21038 5% 42% 87.4% 8865 29559 95% 58% 22.2%
012 other meat and edible meat offal 0.76% 0.67 8.61 7865 27604 8% 88% 23.3% 92272 3818 92% 12% -41.2%
657 special yarns, special textile fabrics 0.58% 0.63 0.87 2598 17792 7% 21% 37.8% 32184 65938 93% 79% 12.7%
746 ball or roller bearings 0.57% 0.03 0.38 625 15460 0% 9% 70.7% 151719 151738 100% 91% 0.0%
081 feeding stuff for animals 0.53% 1.45 3.81 738 14502 16% 45% 64.3% 3993 17885 84% 55% 28.4%
748 transmission shafts 0.53% 0.08 0.35 1639 15301 1% 9% 45.1% 163868 147281 99% 91% -1.8%
344 petroleum gases 0.48% 1.31 4.10 13871 26358 14% 49% 11.3% 82827 27075 86% 51% -17.0%
747 taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances 0.47% 0.24 0.44 2333 14552 3% 11% 35.7% 76017 114632 97% 89% 7.1%
751 office machines 0.47% 0.09 0.40 384 12503 1% 17% 78.7% 34238 60319 99% 83% 9.9%
597 prepared additives for mineral oils and the like 0.45% 0.14 0.92 632 12317 2% 15% 64.0% 36252 67928 98% 85% 11.0%
074 tea and mate 0.44% 0.16 28.79 3 11328 2% 94% 294.6% 144 727 98% 6% 31.0%
682 copper 0.42% 0.01 0.16 397 11431 0% 5% 75.1% 217506 210758 100% 95% -0.5%
654 other textile fabrics, woven 0.38% 1.84 2.11 2780 12786 19% 29% 29.0% 11809 31884 81% 71% 18.0%
248 wood, simply worked 0.37% 102.87 223.25 15394 25016 93% 97% 8.4% 1170 717 7% 3% -7.8%
699 manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 0.36% 0.08 0.28 643 10067 1% 7% 58.2% 64491 137881 99% 93% 13.5%
288 non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s. 0.35% 0.01 1.28 37 9218 0% 41% 150.8% 29482 13317 100% 59% -12.4%
531 synthetic organic colouring matter 0.35% 0.70 0.70 6242 15369 8% 12% 16.2% 69928 112284 92% 88% 8.2%
679 tubes, pipes and hollow profiles 0.34% 0.53 0.85 4344 13198 6% 20% 20.3% 63810 51238 94% 80% -3.6%
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Source: computed from UN COMTRADE statistics. NB Regional orientation: for definition, see text.33
7DEOH&3DUDJXD\WRSWKLUW\LPSRUWVZLWKLQFUHDVHGUHJLRQDORULHQWDWLRQIURP0(5&2685VRXUFHV
6,7&
5HY￿
￿
FRGH
3URGXFW￿GHVFULSWLRQ ￿￿RI￿WRWDO￿LPSRUWV
ZLWK￿LQFUHDVHG
UHJLRQDO￿RULHQWDWLRQ
5HJLRQDO￿RULHQWDWLRQ 0(5&2685￿LPSRUWV 5R:￿LPSRUWV
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
86
￿￿￿￿￿V
86
￿￿￿￿￿V
￿
VKDUH
￿
VKDUH
DQQ￿￿DYJ￿
JURZWK
UDWH
86
￿￿￿￿￿V
86
￿￿￿￿￿V
￿
VKDUH
￿
VKDUH
DQQ￿￿DYJ￿
JURZWK
UDWH
122 tobacco, manufactured 19.76% 0.05 3.82 577 135916 3% 75% 148.5% 19449 46337 97% 25% 15.6%
334 petroleum oils (bituminous) 10.70% 12.26 22.74 73137 146441 88% 81% 12.3% 10154 33794 12% 19% 22.2%
001 live animals other than animals of division 03 8.23% 4.97 336 368 56691 74% 100% 131.5% 126 189 26% 0% 7.0%
591 insecticides, rodenticides, fungicides, herbicides 4.01% 0.34 2.50 1601 29076 17% 69% 62.1% 7989 13062 83% 31% 8.5%
783 road motor vehicles, n.e.s. 3.35% 2.77 2.83 3898 26819 62% 86% 37.9% 2397 4437 38% 14% 10.8%
542 medicaments (including veterinary medicaments) 2.88% 1.13 2.20 2253 22002 40% 66% 46.2% 3401 11173 60% 34% 21.9%
022 milk and cream 2.82% 0.10 391 75 19382 5% 98% 152.4% 1291 411 95% 2% -17.4%
781 motor cars and other motor vehicles 2.46% 0.25 0.27 3294 20126 13% 20% 35.2% 22007 81286 87% 80% 24.3%
333 petroleum oils (bituminous) 2.28% 0.00 1.52 13 15655 0% 30% 226.2% 67149 36633 100% 70% -9.6%
562 fertilizers (other than those of group 272) 2.27% 8.78 311 6985 22534 84% 95% 21.6% 1354 1130 16% 5% -3.0%
641 paper and paperboard 2.25% 1.92 1.98 8847 24268 53% 75% 18.3% 7826 8097 47% 25% 0.6%
098 edible products and preparations, n.e.s. 2.11% 0.48 1.80 988 15425 22% 60% 58.1% 3540 10073 78% 40% 19.0%
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape 2.01% 0.66 1.62 616 14390 28% 64% 69.1% 1594 8111 72% 36% 31.1%
554 soap, cleansing and polishing preparations 1.83% 1.01 11.74 217 12720 37% 92% 97.1% 366 1110 63% 8% 20.3%
893 articles, n.e.s. of plastics 1.80% 1.52 1.68 1597 13904 47% 67% 43.4% 1786 6868 53% 33% 25.2%
784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles 1.76% 0.71 1.80 1737 13767 29% 61% 41.2% 4189 8737 71% 39% 13.0%
062 sugar confectionery 1.63% 3.79 6.58 652 11804 69% 91% 62.0% 293 1151 31% 9% 25.6%
851 footwear 1.48% 0.23 0.52 584 10751 12% 53% 62.5% 4274 9540 88% 47% 14.3%
674 flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel 1.47% 1.65 12.89 920 10972 49% 90% 51.2% 949 1152 51% 10% 3.3%
673 flat-rolled products, of iron or non-alloy steel 1.39% 3.99 16912 1508 11014 70% 88% 39.3% 644 1439 30% 12% 14.3%
553 perfumery, cosmetics or toilet preparations 1.31% 0.18 0.50 540 9530 10% 36% 61.4% 5113 16731 90% 64% 21.8%
652 cotton fabrics, woven 1.21% 1.55 7.30 248 8504 48% 84% 80.2% 273 1599 52% 16% 34.3%
693 wire products 1.11% 3.97 17.42 648 8269 70% 79% 52.9% 278 2243 30% 21% 41.6%
684 aluminium 1.09% 4.82 9.07 1345 8827 74% 91% 36.8% 475 924 26% 9% 11.7%
121 tobacco, unmanufactured 1.03% 157.23 2247 277 7319 99% 91% 72.6% 3 764 1% 9% 151.8%
112 alcoholic beverages 1.01% 0.02 0.08 310 7234 1% 11% 69.0% 28808 58445 99% 89% 12.5%
699 manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. 0.96% 1.61 2.45 1479 8043 49% 64% 32.6% 1565 4427 51% 36% 18.9%
073 chocolate and other food preparations 0.94% 3.09 6.42 359 6789 64% 88% 63.2% 198 962 36% 12% 30.1%
662 clay construction materials 0.88% 10.93 19.77 2034 8086 87% 98% 25.9% 317 167 13% 2% -10.1%
891 arms and ammunition 0.87% 0.10 1.21 42 5977 6% 71% 128.5% 721 2399 94% 29% 22.2%
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Source: computed from UN COMTRADE statistics. NB Regional orientation: for definition, see text.34
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098 edible products and preparations, n.e.s. 7.11% 1.61 4.50 6734 39050 57% 78% 79.7% 5138 11046 43% 22% 29.1%
782 motor vehicles for the transport of goods 6.91% 1.31 1.53 20646 52070 52% 55% 36.1% 19426 43414 48% 45% 30.7%
611 leather 5.18% 4.17 24.83 19548 43081 77% 95% 30.1% 5767 2209 23% 5% -27.4%
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape 4.49% 1.63 3.33 10448 30876 57% 72% 43.5% 7868 11795 43% 28% 14.4%
061 sugars, molasses and honey 4.43% 2.29 20.57 11416 31574 65% 94% 40.4% 6115 1955 35% 6% -31.6%
641 paper and paperboard 3.25% 1.27 1.40 14911 29676 51% 52% 25.8% 14379 26928 49% 48% 23.3%
721 agricultural machinery (excluding tractors) 3.20% 1.32 1.55 8355 22896 52% 55% 39.9% 7761 18808 48% 45% 34.3%
764 telecommunications equipment, n.e.s. 3.09% 0.08 0.22 1454 15500 6% 14% 120.1% 21244 91562 94% 86% 62.7%
542 medicaments (including veterinary medicaments) 3.04% 0.85 1.04 14803 28633 41% 45% 24.6% 21481 35221 59% 55% 17.9%
722 tractors 2.66% 1.26 1.57 6590 18685 51% 55% 41.5% 6429 15201 49% 45% 33.2%
553 perfumery, cosmetics or toilet preparations 2.53% 0.75 1.75 4551 16051 38% 58% 52.2% 7437 11659 62% 42% 16.2%
893 articles, n.e.s. of plastics 2.44% 1.18 1.52 12857 23958 49% 54% 23.1% 13353 20136 51% 46% 14.7%
554 soap, cleansing and polishing preparations 2.36% 0.94 2.45 3724 14460 43% 66% 57.2% 4864 7529 57% 34% 15.7%
048 cereal preparations and preparations of flour 2.12% 1.03 4.04 2192 11854 46% 76% 75.5% 2615 3732 54% 24% 12.6%
591 insecticides, rodenticides, fungicides, herbicides 2.10% 0.59 0.89 5352 14910 32% 41% 40.7% 11192 21329 68% 59% 24.0%
074 tea and mate 2.10% 40.27 44.45 25429 34980 97% 97% 11.2% 776 1002 3% 3% 8.9%
728 other machinery and equipment specialized 1.97% 0.56 0.91 5737 14694 31% 42% 36.8% 12634 20558 69% 58% 17.6%
081 feeding stuff for animals 1.88% 4.80 7.96 4375 12926 80% 86% 43.5% 1119 2069 20% 14% 22.7%
121 tobacco, unmanufactured; tobacco refuse. 1.54% 1.33 3.78 4792 11806 52% 75% 35.1% 4442 3975 48% 25% -3.6%
725 paper mill and pulp mill machinery 1.50% 1.11 3.57 800 7630 48% 74% 112.1% 882 2722 52% 26% 45.6%
821 furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses 1.41% 0.91 1.93 8471 14878 42% 60% 20.7% 11471 9811 58% 40% -5.1%
575 other plastics, in primary forms 1.35% 0.86 1.26 6703 12862 41% 50% 24.3% 9605 13049 59% 50% 10.8%
784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles 1.33% 2.47 3.40 20832 26859 67% 73% 8.8% 10352 10066 33% 27% -0.9%
073 chocolate and other food preparations 1.24% 2.16 3.19 2242 7902 64% 71% 52.2% 1273 3153 36% 29% 35.3%
845 articles of apparel, of textile fabrics 1.19% 0.15 1.59 2388 7783 11% 56% 48.3% 19566 6217 89% 44% -31.8%
222 oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 1.13% 4.18 16.32 2082 7229 77% 93% 51.4% 612 564 23% 7% -2.7%
573 polymers of vinyl chloride 1.11% 2.11 2.79 4033 9078 63% 69% 31.1% 2350 4142 37% 31% 20.8%
044 maize (not including sweet corn) unmilled 0.99% 79.89 93.08 7541 12061 98% 99% 16.9% 116 165 2% 1% 12.5%
652 cotton fabrics, woven 0.98% 1.53 2.28 5837 10277 55% 64% 20.8% 4703 5740 45% 36% 6.9%
684 aluminium 0.95% 10.44 20.82 7080 11413 89% 94% 17.3% 833 698 11% 6% -5.7%
7RWDO￿RI￿DERYH￿SURGXFWV ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Source: computed from UN COMTRADE statistics. NB Regional orientation: for definition, see text.35
7DEOH$$UJHQWLQD0(5&2685SDUWQHUV¶5&$VPDLQUHJLRQDOVXSSOLHUVDQGFDSLWDOLQWHQVLW\IRUSURGXFWV
ZLWKDQLQFUHDVHGWHQGHQF\RIEHLQJLPSRUWHGIURP0(5&2685VRXUFHV
&RGH 3URGXFW￿GHVFULSWLRQ 0DLQ￿UHJLRQDO
VXSSOLHUV
’RHV￿￿GR￿￿WKH￿PDLQ￿UHJLRQDO￿VXSSOLHU￿V￿￿KDYH￿D￿UHYHDOHG￿FRPSDUDWLYH￿DGYDQWDJH" &DSLWDO￿
LQWHQVLW\
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿
784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles Brazil no yes no no 120
713 internal combustion piston engines Brazil yes yes no yes 102
672 ingots and other primary forms, iron or steel Brazil yes yes no yes 82
071 coffee and coffee substitutes Brazil yes yes yes yes *
778 electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. Brazil no no no no 91
652 cotton fabrics, woven Brazil no yes no no 49-51
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape Brazil no yes yes yes 80-125
722 tractors Brazil yes no no no 122-124
281 iron ore and concentrates Brazil yes yes no yes *
574 polyacetals, other polyethers, epoxide resins Brazil no no no no *
285 aluminium ores and concentrates Brazil yes yes yes yes *
752 automatic data processing machines Brazil no no no no 122-134
772 electronic circuit equipment Brazil no no no no 85
591 insecticides, rodenticides, fungicides Brazil no yes no no *
542 medicaments (incl. veterinary medicaments) Brazil no no no no *
334 petroleum oils Brazil yes yes no no *
511 hydrocarbons, n.e.s. Brazil yes yes no yes *
651 textile yarn Brazil yes no no no 49
733 machine-tools for working metal Brazil no no no yes 92
658 made-up articles (textiles) Brazil yes yes yes yes 51-68
851 footwear Brazil/ Uruguay yes/no yes/yes no/no yes/yes 46-54
821 furniture and parts thereof Brazil no no no no 60
554 soap, cleansing and polishing preparations Brazil no no no no 160
675 flat-rolled products of alloy steel Brazil yes no no no 145
874 measuring instruments Brazil no no no no *
522 inorganic chemical elements Brazil yes yes yes yes *
696 cutlery Brazil yes yes yes yes 121
742 pumps for liquids Brazil no yes yes yes 113
771 electric power machinery Brazil no no no no *
533 pigments, paints, varnishes, related materials Brazil/ Uruguay no/yes no/yes yes/no no/no *
Sources: RCAs and main regional suppliers computed or derived from UN COMTRADE statistics (using 1995 data). Capital intensity derived from Yeats (1989).
Notes:  * = unavailable or not applicable; a country is listed as a main regional supplier if it accounts for more than twenty per cent of MERCOSUR imports in this market.
capital-intensity = a figure above one hundred indicates that the product is more capital-intensive than the average for US manufacturing.36
7DEOH%%UD]LO0(5&2685SDUWQHUV¶5&$VPDLQUHJLRQDOVXSSOLHUVDQGFDSLWDOLQWHQVLW\IRUSURGXFWV
ZLWKDQLQFUHDVHGWHQGHQF\RIEHLQJLPSRUWHGIURP0(5&2685VRXUFHV
&RGH 3URGXFW￿GHVFULSWLRQ 0DLQ￿UHJLRQDO
VXSSOLHUV
’RHV￿￿GR￿￿WKH￿PDLQ￿UHJLRQDO￿VXSSOLHU￿V￿￿KDYH￿D￿UHYHDOHG￿FRPSDUDWLYH￿DGYDQWDJH" &DSLWDO￿
LQWHQVLW\
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿
048 cereal preparations and preparations of flour Argentina/Uruguay no/yes yes/yes no/no no/no *
784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles Argentina no no no no 120
222 oil seeds and oleaginous fruits Paraguay yes yes no yes *
054 vegetables, fresh, chilled or frozen Argentina yes yes yes yes *
022 milk and cream Argentina/Uruguay yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes no/yes *
421 fixed vegetable fats and oils Argentina/Paraguay yes/yes yes/yes yes/no yes/no *
044 maize (not including sweet corn) unmilled Argentina/Paraguay yes/no yes/yes yes/no yes/no *
713 internal combustion piston engines Argentina no no no no 102
001 live animals Uruguay/Argentina yes/no yes/yes yes/no yes/no *
893 articles, n.e.s. of plastics Uruguay/Argentina no/no no/no no/no no/no 81-87
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape Argentina no no no no 80-125
582 plates, sheets, film, foil and strip, of plastics Argentina yes no no no 81-87
572 polymers of styrene, in primary forms Argentina no no no no *
012 other meat and edible meat offal Argentina/Uruguay yes/yes yes/no yes/yes yes/no *
657 special yarns, special textile fabrics Argentina no no no no 51-68
746 ball or roller bearings Argentina no no no no *
081 feeding stuff for animals Arg. /Par./Uru. yes/yes/yes yes/yes/no no/no/no yes/yes/no *
748 transmission shafts Argentina no no no no *
344 petroleum gases Argentina yes yes no no *
747 taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances Argentina no no no no *
751 office machines Argentina/Uruguay no/no no/no no/no no/no *
597 prepared additives for mineral oils and the like Argentina no no no no *
074 tea and mate Argentina yes yes no yes *
682 copper Argentina no no yes no *
654 other textile fabrics, woven Uruguay yes yes no yes 57-67
248 wood, simply worked Paraguay yes yes no yes *
699 manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. Argentina no no no no 84
288 non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s. Argentina /Uruguay no/no no/no no/no no/no *
531 synthetic organic colouring matter Argentina no no no no *
679 tubes, pipes and hollow profiles Uruguay/Argentina no/yes no/yes no/no no/yes 101
Sources: RCAs and main regional suppliers computed or derived from UN COMTRADE statistics (using 1995 data). Capital intensity derived from Yeats (1989).
Notes:  * = unavailable or not applicable; a country is listed as a main regional supplier if it accounts for more than twenty per cent of MERCOSUR imports in this market.
capital-intensity = a figure above one hundred indicates that the product is more capital-intensive than the average for US manufacturing.37
7DEOH&3DUDJXD\0(5&2685SDUWQHUV¶5&$VPDLQUHJLRQDOVXSSOLHUVDQGFDSLWDOLQWHQVLW\IRUSURGXFWV
ZLWKDQLQFUHDVHGWHQGHQF\RIEHLQJLPSRUWHGIURP0(5&2685VRXUFHV
&RGH 3URGXFW￿GHVFULSWLRQ 0DLQ￿UHJLRQDO
VXSSOLHUV
’RHV￿￿GR￿￿WKH￿PDLQ￿UHJLRQDO￿VXSSOLHU￿V￿￿KDYH￿D￿UHYHDOHG￿FRPSDUDWLYH￿DGYDQWDJH" &DSLWDO￿
LQWHQVLW\
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿
122 tobacco, manufactured Brazil no yes yes yes 210
334 petroleum oils Argentina/Brazil yes/yes yes/no no/no yes/no *
001 live animals Argentina no yes no no *
591 insecticides, rodenticides, fungicides, herbicides Brazil/Argentina no/yes yes/yes no/no no/no *
783 road motor vehicles, n.e.s. Brazil yes no no no 122
542 medicaments (including veterinary medicaments) Argentina/Uruguay no/no no/no no/no no/no *
022 milk and cream and milk products other than butter Argentina yes yes yes no *
781 motor cars and other motor vehicles Brazil no no no no 122
333 petroleum oils Argentina no yes no yes *
562 fertilizers (other than those of group 272) Brazil no no no no *
641 paper and paperboard Brazil yes yes no yes *
098 edible products and preparations, n.e.s. Argentina no yes no no *
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape Argentina/Brazil no/no no/yes no/yes no/yes 80-120
554 soap, cleansing and polishing preparations Brazil/Argentina no/no no/no no/no no/no 160
893 articles, n.e.s. of plastics Argentina Brazil no/no no/no no/no no/no 81-87
784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles Brazil no yes no no 120
062 sugar confectionery Argentina/Brazil yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes yes/yes *
851 footwear Argentina/Brazil no/yes no/yes no/no no/yes 46-54
674 flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel Argentina yes no no yes *
673 flat-rolled products, of iron or non-alloy steel Argentina/Brazil yes/yes yes/yes no/no yes/yes *
553 perfumery, cosmetics or toilet preparations Argentina/Brazil no/no yes/no yes/yes no/no 160
652 cotton fabrics, woven Brazil no yes no no 49-51
693 wire products Brazil yes yes yes yes 73
684 aluminium Argentina yes yes no yes *
121 tobacco, unmanufactured Brazil/Argentina yes/yes yes/yes no/no yes/yes *
112 alcoholic beverages Argentina no no no no *
699 manufactures of base metal, n.e.s. Brazil/Argentina no/no no/no no/no no/no 84
073 chocolate and other food preparations Brazil/Argentina no/no no/yes yes/no no/no *
662 clay construction materials Brazil yes yes no yes 76
891 arms and ammunition Brazil no no no no *
Sources: RCAs and main regional suppliers computed or derived from UN COMTRADE statistics (using 1995 data). Capital intensity derived from Yeats (1989).
Notes:  * = unavailable or not applicable; a country is listed as a main regional supplier if it accounts for more than twenty per cent of MERCOSUR imports in this market.
capital-intensity = a figure above one hundred indicates that the product is more capital-intensive than the average for US manufacturing.38
7DEOH'8UXJXD\0(5&2685SDUWQHUV¶5&$VPDLQUHJLRQDOVXSSOLHUVDQGFDSLWDOLQWHQVLW\IRUSURGXFWV
ZLWKDQLQFUHDVHGWHQGHQF\RIEHLQJLPSRUWHGIURP0(5&2685VRXUFHV
&RGH 3URGXFW￿GHVFULSWLRQ 0DLQ￿UHJLRQDO
VXSSOLHUV
’RHV￿￿GR￿￿WKH￿PDLQ￿UHJLRQDO￿VXSSOLHU￿V￿￿KDYH￿D￿UHYHDOHG￿FRPSDUDWLYH￿DGYDQWDJH" &DSLWDO￿
LQWHQVLW\
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
%DODVVD
￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
<HDWV
￿￿￿￿￿￿
098 edible products and preparations, n.e.s. Argentina /Brazil no/no yes/no no/no no/no *
782 motor vehicles for the transport of goods Brazil yes yes yes no 122
611 leather Argentina/Paraguay yes/yes yes/yes no/no yes/yes 69
642 paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape Argentina/Brazil no/no no/yes no/yes no/yes 80-125
061 sugars, molasses and honey Brazil yes yes yes yes *
641 paper and paperboard Brazil/Argentina yes/no yes/no no/no yes/no *
721 agricultural machinery (excluding tractors) Brazil no yes yes no 122-124
764 telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.; Argentina/Brazil no/no no/no no/yes no/no 105-120
542 medicaments (including veterinary medicaments) Argentina no no no no *
722 tractors Brazil yes no no no 122-124
553 perfumery, cosmetics or toilet preparations Argentina no yes yes no 160
893 articles, n.e.s. of plastics Argentina/Brazil no/no no/no no/no no/no 81-87
554 soap, cleansing and polishing preparations Argentina no no no no 160
048 cereal preparations and preparations of flour Argentina/Brazil no/no yes/no no/no yes/no *
591 insecticides, rodenticides, fungicides Argentina/Brazil yes/no yes/yes no/no no/no *
074 tea and mate Brazil yes yes no yes *
728 other machinery and equipment specialized Brazil/Argentina no/no no/no no/no no/no 77-88
081 feeding stuff for animals Argentina yes yes yes yes *
121 tobacco, unmanufactured tobacco refuse Brazil yes yes no yes *
725 paper mill and pulp mill machinery Brazil yes yes no yes 99
821 furniture and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses Brazil/Argentina no/no no/no no/no no/no 60
575 other plastics, in primary forms Brazil/Argentina no/yes no/no no/no no/no *
784 parts and accessories of motor vehicles Brazil/Argentina no/no yes/no no/no no/no 120
073 chocolate and other food preparations Brazil/Argentina no/no no/yes yes/no no/no *
845 articles of apparel, of textile fabrics Brazil/Argentina no/no no/no no/no no/no 36-64
222 oil seeds and oleaginous fruits Argentina yes yes yes yes *
573 polymers of vinyl chloride Brazil/Argentina no/no yes/no no/no yes/no *
044 maize (not including sweet corn) unmilled Argentina yes yes yes yes *
652 cotton fabrics, woven Brazil/Argentina no/no yes/no no/no no/no 49-51
684 aluminium Brazil/Argentina yes/yes yes/yes yes/no yes/yes *
Sources: RCAs and main regional suppliers computed or derived from UN COMTRADE statistics (using 1995 data). Capital intensity derived from Yeats (1989).
Notes:  * = unavailable or not applicable; a country is listed as a main regional supplier if it accounts for more than twenty per cent of MERCOSUR imports in this market.
capital-intensity = a figure above one hundred indicates that the product is more capital-intensive than the average for US manufacturing.7DEOH7DULIIDQGQRQWDULIIEDUULHUVLQ$UJHQWLQD%UD]LO8UXJXD\
WKH86WKH(8DQG(DVW$VLDDQGWKH3DFLILF
$UJHQWLQD %UD]LO 8UXJXD\ 86 (8 (DVW￿$VLD
DQG
3DFLILF
1
SRVW￿8UXJXD\￿5RXQG￿DSSOLHG￿WDULIIV
Agriculture excluding fish
2 4.9 11.0 9.5 2.2 3.7 11.2
Fish and fish products 5.1 5.8 11.9 0.9 11.0 9.1
Petroleum oils 29.1 0.0 33.7 0.7 0.4 8.3
Wood, pulp, paper and furniture 9.9 2.0 7.2 0.2 0.3 7.4
Textiles and clothing 12.1 15.5 6.4 14.8 8.7 17.5
Leather, rubber, footwear 8.4 10.6 10.9 6.9 4.9 13.8
Metals 9.3 5.6 8.2 1.1 1.0 8.2
Chemical and photographic suppl. 6.1 11.5 9.9 2.5 3.8 11.0
Transport equipment 14.7 11.7 10.7 3.4 5.5 22.8
Non-electric machinery 13.7 18.9 8.3 0.9 1.4 13.3
Electric machinery 15.2 16.6 8.9 1.7 5.4 12.9
Mineral prod., prec. stones & metal 9.6 1.2 9.5 1.7 0.5 7.9
Manufactured articles n.e.s. 14.2 15.2 8.8 0.4 2.5 10.2
6KDUH￿RI￿LPSRUWV￿ FRYHUHG￿E\￿ QRQ￿
WDULII￿EDUULHUV￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
All products 0.2 1.5 * 4.3 13.4 2.1 - 5.5
Primary products 0.1 4.1 * 4.0 22.0 1.2 - 8.8
Manufactured products 0.3 0.4 * 4.3 11.5 2.0 - 4.2
Source: Finger, Ingco and Reincke (1996) for tariffs and World Bank (1997) for non-tariff barriers.
Notes:  1. East Asia and the Pacific = Indonesia, Korea, Macau, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand.
    Non-tariff barriers range shown for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand
2. Estimate 2 from Finger, Ingco and Reincke (1996).
* = unavailable40
7DEOH$$UJHQWLQD7HFKQRORJ\FRQWHQWRILPSRUWV
7HFKQRORJ\
FRQWHQW RI
LPSRUWV
0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


Standard 34 66 34 66
Intermediate 31 69 28 72
High 10 90 11 89
T o t a l 2 57 52 47 6
7DEOH%%UD]LO7HFKQRORJ\FRQWHQWRILPSRUWV
7HFKQRORJ\
FRQWHQW RI
LPSRUWV
0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


Standard 30 70 28 72
Intermediate 6 94 12 88
H i g h 29 829 8
T o t a l 1 18 91 48 6
7DEOH&3DUDJXD\7HFKQRORJ\FRQWHQWRILPSRUWV
7HFKQRORJ\
FRQWHQW RI
LPSRUWV
0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


Standard 30 70 47 53
Intermediate 40 60 40 60
High 37 63 25 75
T o t a l 3 76 33 96 1
7DEOH'8UXJXD\7HFKQRORJ\FRQWHQWRILPSRUWV
7HFKQRORJ\
FRQWHQW RI
LPSRUWV
0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


0(5&2685


5HVWRI:RUOG


Standard 48 52 58 42
Intermediate 49 51 47 53
High 30 70 26 74
T o t a l 4 55 54 65 4
Source: Computed from UN COMTRADE statistics. For definitions of technology, see Annexe 1.41
$QQH[H&ODVVLILFDWLRQRIWHFKQRORJ\FRQWHQWRIWUDGHE\6,7&5HY
6,7&5HYFRGH 3URGXFWGHVFULSWLRQ
+LJK7HFKQRORJ\
  54 Pharmaceutical products
  72 Machinery specialized for particular industries
  74 General industrial machinery and equipment
  75 Computer and other office machines
  764 Telecommunications equipment
  772 Electronic components (excluding semiconductors)
  774 Medical apparatus
  776 Semiconductors, etc.
  778 Electrical machinery and apparatus
  792 Aircraft and associated equipment, spacecraft, etc.
  793 Ships, boats and floating structures
  87 Professional, scientific and controlling instruments
  88 Photographic and optical apparatus and equipment
,QWHUPHGLDWH7HFKQRORJ\
  3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
  5 (less 54) Chemicals and related products
  61 Leather, leather manufactures
  62 Rubber manufactures
  64 Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp
  71 Power generating machinery and equipment
  73 Metal working machinery
  76 (less 764) Sound recording equipment
  77 (less 772, 774, 776, 778) Household appliances, transformers, etc.
  78 Road vehicles
6WDQGDUG7HFKQRORJ\
  0 Food and live animals
  1 Beverages and tobacco
  2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
  4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
  63 Cork and wood manufactures
  65 Textile yarn, fabrics
  66 Non-metallic mineral manufactures
  67 Iron and steel
  68 Non-ferrous metals
  69 Manufactures of metals
  79 (less 792, 793) Other transport equipment
  81 Prefabricated buildings, etc.
  82 Furniture, etc.
  83 Travel goods, handbags, etc.
  84 Articles of apparel and clothing, etc.
  85 Footwear
  89 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
  9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere
Source: Foders (1996), Table 7.42
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